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According to philosophical “situationism”, psychological evidence shows that human
action is typically best explained by the inﬂuence of situational factors and not by
“global” and robust character traits of the agent. As a practical implication of their
view, situationists recommend that efforts in moral education be shifted from
character development to situation management. Much of the discussion has focused
on whether global conceptions of virtue and character, and in particular Aristotelian
virtue ethics, can be defended against the situationist challenge. After several rounds
of debate, both sides claim victory, and they seem to have reached a stalemate. In this
paper, I refocus the debate on the arguments offered in support of situationism itself.
I argue that two serious problems have so far gone unnoticed in the literature. First,
the argument in support of situationism is unsound. It is based on evidence that
agents’ morally relevant behavior reliably covaries with morally irrelevant situational
variables. Using the example of egoism, I show that this evidence does not warrant
the situationist inference because the evidence permits a plausible alternative
interpretation. Second, I argue that the situationists’ advocacy of situation
management is at odds with their core thesis because situation management requires
exactly the type of agency they reject as unrealistic.
Keywords: situationism; moral psychology; character; practical reason; situation
management
1. Introduction
The core of “situationism”, as a position in philosophical moral psychology, is the view that
human moral behavior is typically best explained by reference to situational circumstance
rather than to the agent’s character or convictions. According to situationists, empirical evi-
dence shows that what accounts for morally relevant behavior is typically not the moral dis-
positions and beliefs of individual agents, but, rather, “depersonalized response tendencies,
which function largely independently of actors’ evaluative commitments” (Merritt, Doris,
and Harman 2010, 370, emphasis original; see also Doris 2002; Harman 1999, 2000). These
response tendencies are “activated” by seemingly insigniﬁcant or morally irrelevant fea-
tures of a situation, and they are “not only indifferent to personal values, but also resistant
to intentional direction” or “without intentional direction” (Merritt et al. 2010, 370, 371).
The situationists’ point is not to deny that agents have relatively stable moral beliefs,
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attitudes, and values (Doris 2002, 87). Rather, they deny that these are typically the causes
of agents’ behavior.1
Situationists agree in denying the widespread existence of “global” character traits that
are stable and “robust”, that is, broad traits, such as honesty or courage, that reliably mani-
fest themselves in the form of behavior that is consistent across a variety of trait-relevant
situations and in spite of contrary pressures.2 Gilbert Harman has argued that “there is
no empirical support for the existence of character traits” at all (Harman 1999, 330;
2000). John Doris and Peter Vranas defend a more moderate position, arguing that while
the evidence does not support the existence of “global” traits, there is empirical support
for the existence of “local” or “fragmentary” character traits that are tied to certain situ-
ations, such as honesty-towards-friends or sailing-in-rough-weather-with-one’s-friends-
courage (Doris 2002, 115; Vranas 2005, 30). But situationists all maintain that the
number of agents with global character traits is at best very small. Doris calls substantial
behavioral consistency of the kind that is evidence of global traits “rare enough to count
as abnormal” (Doris 2002, 65); Vranas allows for a slightly larger minority (2005).
Their use of qualiﬁers such as “largely” and “typically” should not obscure the fact that,
by their own account, the situationists’ core thesis is radically at odds with common con-
ceptions of human behavior.3 Humans are said to have a strong tendency to attribute
morally relevant behavior to allegedly global character traits and to the moral convictions
of agents, and the situationist thesis is that doing so is typically unwarranted. The further
lesson, for moral philosophers in particular, is that “conceptions of practical rationality
. . . are unlikely to play a central role in an empirically sophisticated account of moral cog-
nition and behavior” (Merritt et al. 2010, 370).
As a practical implication of their core thesis, situationists recommend that efforts to
improve our behavior should focus on situation management strategies rather than character
development. This should prompt a shift in the focus of moral education:
Rather than striving to develop characters that will determine our behavior in ways substan-
tially independent of circumstance, we should invest more of our energies in attending to
the features of our environment that inﬂuence behavioral outcome. (Doris 2002, 146)
Few people will deny that some form of situation management is good advice. The radical-
ity of the situationists’ claim lies in their contention that striving to develop good (global)
character traits is futile – or even worse, insofar as it distracts us from what really does
make a positive difference, namely situation management.
The situationists’ claims have sparked a heated and still expanding debate in moral psy-
chology and ethics. Although the passages quoted show that their core thesis has a much
wider scope, because it concerns the role of rationality in action more broadly, their argu-
ments have been directed mainly against Aristotelian virtue ethics and its conception of
character.4 As a result, much of the ensuing debate has focused on the question whether
situationism really does undermine Aristotelianism. Situationists take the empirical evi-
dence to show that character traits of the kind the Aristotelians uphold as virtues hardly
exist. Opponents of situationism have formulated a number of replies to the situationist
challenge. Situationists in turn, however, ﬁnd these defenses unconvincing. After several
rounds of debate, both sides claim that their position remains unscathed.5
In this essay, I aim to move beyond this impasse and shift the focus of the discussion
away from the debate over the situationist challenge as such and onto the structure of the
arguments in support of situationism itself. There are two crucial weaknesses in the argu-
ment that have so far gone unnoticed: the argument for the core thesis includes an invalid

























inference, and the situationists’ advocacy of “situation management” to improve moral
behavior involves them in self-contradiction.
It is important to examine the strength of the situationists’ argument as such, instead of
merely responding to their criticisms or showing – important though this is – that there are
alternative ways of looking at the empirical facts. For situationists will regard any rejoinders
in support of the existence of global character as failures to take seriously the allegedly
widespread phenomenon of behavioral inconsistency. In this paper, I circumvent the
current frontlines and show that the situationists’ own argument is seriously ﬂawed at a
more fundamental level.
I ﬁrst examine the situationist argument in support of the core thesis and show that it
includes an invalid inference (Sections 2 and 3). I then show that the empirical evidence
indeed permits a different interpretation (Section 4). I subsequently argue that the type of
agency involved in the recommended situation management cannot be accounted for in
terms of the situationists’ core thesis. Situationists implicitly attribute a crucial role to
reason-motivated agency (Section 5). I conclude that situationism fails to make the case
against the widespread existence of global character traits and against the signiﬁcant role
of reason in action. This conclusion does not diminish the great moral signiﬁcance of
empirical psychology, however (Section 6).
2. Egoism and the evidence of behavioral consistency
Situationists base their core thesis on evidence from empirical psychology. They take the
evidence to indicate that the widespread human tendency to attribute morally relevant
behavior to agents’ global and robust character traits is misguided. Frequently invoked evi-
dence includes the famous experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram in the 1960s, which
showed that a large majority of ordinary test subjects were willing to give severely painful
or even fatal electric shocks to a person whom they believed to be a fellow test subject, at
the polite request of an experimenter (Milgram 1974). Yet, researchers also found very high
percentages of test subjects who helped someone who appeared to be electrocuted, when
doing so posed no danger to themselves (Clark and Word 1974). Other evidence shows
that when the sun is shining, people are more inclined to display helping behavior than
when it is cloudy (Cunningham 1979), and that pleasant smells also signiﬁcantly increase
people’s willingness to help (Baron 1997; Isen and Levin 1972), whereas noise and hurry-
ing decrease it (Darley and Batson 1973, Mathews and Canon 1975). If our willingness to
help or hurt varies reliably with morally irrelevant situational variables, so the situationist
reasoning goes, then global character traits apparently do not play much of a role in deter-
mining our morally relevant behavior. But how exactly do situtionists argue for this claim?
It would be a mistake to read the situationist point as depending simply on the obser-
vation that moral behavior covaries with variations in the experimental set-up. After all,
if behavior turns out to vary with the situation, this could in principle reﬂect the agent’s
appropriate and reason-based sensitivity to relevant differences between situations, and
if so, the covariation as such would not support situationism. The situationist point is,
more precisely, that the agents’ morally relevant behavior (say, helping or not helping
others in need) reliably covaries with morally irrelevant differences in the experimental
set-up. They take this to show that the variation in behavior cannot be explained in
terms of the agents’ reasons for action or in terms of global character traits.
When situationists take this step, they use the following criterion. When they judge that
the evidence indicates that behavior is governed by situational circumstance, they do so on


























latter would be expected to manifest if they were to act on the basis of global character traits;
and, importantly, they formulate the expected behavior in terms of the agents’ moral values
(or “personal values”, “evaluative commitments”, “normative endorsements” and related
expressions). In other words, the situationists argue that insubstantial or morally insigniﬁ-
cant situational inﬂuences produce behavior that runs entirely counter to the behavior one
would expect of agents, given the moral values that the agents endorse. As Merritt, Doris,
and Harman put it in a representative passage, referring to Milgram’s experiments:
Given the widely endorsed moral prohibition on harming innocents against their will, one
expects [the test subjects to stop shocking the learner]. But . . . a clear majority somehow
failed to pull the rational pieces together and treat the harmfulness of their continued obedience
as a decisive reason to stop. (Merritt et al. 2010, 365–366, emphasis added)
In arguing along such lines, situationists assume that if agents endorse a moral value (e.g.
honesty, courage) and if global, stable, and robust character traits exist, agentswill act in accord-
ance with the value whenever this is appropriate. Conversely, the situationists’ basic argument
is that agents’ morally relevant behavior turns out to be neither consistently good nor consist-
ently bad; that it covarieswithmorally extraneous features of situations rather thanwith agents’
moral (or immoral) commitments; and that this behavior should therefore be regarded as best
explained by situational factors, rather than by agents’ character or convictions.
But here is the problem: because they formulate the expected behavior in terms of agents’
moral commitments, situationists overlook the possibility that agents have global traits that
are associatedwith behavior that is neither consistentlymorally goodnor consistentlymorally
bad. One example of such a trait is egoism. A person can consistently act egoistically without
her observable behavior being consistently morally good or bad (in terms of common con-
ceptions of normative ethics – I say more about ethical egoists below). Whether she helps
or harms someone, for example, will depend on whether she considers doing so to be in
her interest. To judge whether a person acts egoistically, therefore, one should not examine
whether her behavior is consistent across situations that differ inmorally relevant or irrelevant
respects, butwhether her behavior is consistent across situations that differ in egoism-relevant
or irrelevant respects. If we broaden the range of possibilities in this way, however, much of
the experimental evidence on which situationists rely no longer offers straightforward evi-
dence of inconsistency. Evidence that people’s behavior is neither consistently morally
good nor consistently morally bad does not sufﬁce to show that people do not have global
traits. The situationists’ inference is based on a false alternative, namely, that people’s behav-
ior should be explained either in terms of their (im)moral convictions or by reference to situa-
tional variables. Situationists overlook a broad range of possible reasons and global character
traits that would lead agents to act consistently without their observable behavior being
consistently morally good or bad.
Before turning, in the next section, to the textual evidence for my claim that the situa-
tionist argument really does have this problematic structure, let me clarify the precise nature
of the problem. Here is an example:
Egoistic Politician:
Suppose a politician endorses helping others in need but nevertheless reliably acts egoistically.
Whether she has a guilty conscience or not, let us suppose she believes that she should be more
beneﬁcent. As it is, she sometimes does help others, namely, when this is in line with her
egoism. For example, in the presence of cameras, she may help a person in need, from a
desire to appear generous or caring. She expects to have a better chance of winning the next

























election when the news depicts her acting beneﬁcently. But when there are no cameras, she
does not help, because she regards doing so not to be in her interest.
Given the structure of the argument for the situationist core thesis, a situationist would inter-
pret the behavioral evidence in this case as follows:
Situationist analysis:
She morally endorses helping others in need, but when there are cameras, she helps, and when
there are no cameras, she does not help. Therefore, her behavior is inconsistent with the behav-
ior that one would expect on the basis of her moral commitments, and it is not best explained by
her conviction that she ought to help or by a global, stable, and robust trait of beneﬁcence.
Rather, her behavior reliably varies with a (beneﬁcence-irrelevant) feature of the situation
(the presence or absence of cameras), and this situational variable is what best explains her be-
havior. She is not a beneﬁcent person. At most, she appears to have the “local”, fragmented and
situation-relative trait of beneﬁcence-in-front-of-cameras.
Situationists formulate agents’ expected behavior in terms of the moral norms they endorse
and assume that when these expectations are not met and behavior covaries with morally
irrelevant situational variables, the agents’ behavior is best explained in terms of these situa-
tional variables.
Given the situationists’ criterion (phrased in terms of the agents’ moral values), ordinary
humans would have to be close to moral saints to avoid being regarded as situation-driven
(as acting “without intentional direction”, on the basis of “depersonalized response ten-
dencies” activated by the situation). The only other option situationists consider is that
of morally “bad” commitments, such as those of agents who value hurting others and
who would meet expectations by acting sadistically.
The egoistic politician, however, is neither saint nor sadist, nor is she best described as
situation-driven. Her behavior varies reliably with the situation, to be sure, but there is a
reasons-based explanation why. She reliably and consistently acts from self-interest, and
her acting from self-interest explains, in terms of reasons on her part, why she helps
when cameras are present and why she does not help when they are not. Most of all, she
wants to further her own interests, and she believes that her interests are best served by
appearing to be beneﬁcent. To put it in terms of global character traits: She is an egoist,
and it shows. In her case, the presence or absence of cameras may well bemorally irrelevant
(namely, in the sense of being irrelevant to the question of whether she ought to help the
person in need), but it is not egoism-irrelevant.
The consistency of her behavior remains invisible from the situationist standpoint. In
the case of the egoistic politician, situationists would register the behavioral pattern (if
camera, then beneﬁcence; if no camera, then no beneﬁcence) without being able to
explain the pattern itself.
I do not mean to suggest that the few pieces of behavioral evidence stipulated in the
example of the egoistic politician would be sufﬁcient to ascribe the global trait of
egoism to a real person: much more evidence would be needed, gathered from a wider
variety of settings. Nor do I claim that people (or politicians) typically act egoistically, or
that egoists are always fully consistent in their behavior. My point is to show why the situa-
tionists’ argument for their core thesis is ﬂawed, and to explain why their thesis does not
have the empirical plausibility they claim for it. In cases such as that of the egoistic poli-
tician, the evidence that an agent endorses beneﬁcence but only acts beneﬁcently depending
on beneﬁcence-irrelevant situational variables does, in fact, allow an explanation in terms of


























To put the point more generally: If we allow for the empirical possibility that people act
for reasons other than their moral convictions – that is, as a matter of description, not of
what it would be most rational for them to do, all things considered – we may suddenly
explain much seemingly inconsistent behavior as consistent across situations after all,
and as evidence of global traits. This type of behavioral consistency applies in the case
of forms of moral failure that do not involve malice, such as cowardice or moral indolence,
in addition to egoism. Persons with such traits fall short of a moral ideal (and hence do not
act in a way that is consistently good) without pursuing harm to others for its own sake
(and hence without acting in a way that is consistently bad). Such agents beneﬁt or
harm others depending on whether this serves some end other than the beneﬁt or harm
as such (for example, their safety, their comfort, or the satisfaction of their private inter-
ests). For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to provide a precise determination
of the complete set of such traits; it is enough to show that such a set exists. Insofar as they
are conceived as forms of moral failure, such traits may be called (non-malicious) vices,6
but it is not necessary for my argument that they be conceived as vices. For example, some
people consider egoism to be a virtue. Psychologists and philosophers who examine
whether the evidence reveals behavioral patterns do not have to introduce substantive
moral commitments in this regard; it is enough for them to broaden the set of possible pat-
terns they consider.
It might be objected, at this point, that the egoistic politician in the example does not
really believe that she ought to help, given her non-beneﬁcent behavior when cameras
are absent. The reason I cast her as someone who endorses beneﬁcence is that situationists
themselves focus on cases in which people endorse a moral value but fail to act accordingly.
Those who deny that the egoistic politician “really” endorses beneﬁcence, given her behav-
ior, may cast her as a wholehearted egoist and the situationists’ argument for their core
thesis would remain equally ﬂawed. The behavioral evidence would remain exactly the
same and the situationist would be equally unjustiﬁed in inferring that the politician’s be-
havior is inconsistent and best explained by the presence or absence of cameras. Her whole-
hearted egoism would still explain why she helps when there are cameras and does not help
when there are none.
In sum, the empirical evidence that agents’ morally relevant behavior varies reliably with
morally irrelevant situational variables is not sufﬁcient to warrant the inference that agents’
behavior is typically inconsistent, that they typically do not act for reasons, and that they typi-
cally have no global character traits. There is an invalid inference at the heart of the argument
that supports the situationists’ core thesis. In arguing for this claim, I am developing a differ-
ent – and more fundamental – criticism than authors who offer alternative explanations of
speciﬁc experimental ﬁndings, such as the explanation of the Milgram experiments in
terms of the subjects’ fear of embarrassment (Sabini and Silver 2005) or their pusillanimity
(Badhwar 2009). Such alternative explanations are consistent with the argument I develop
here, but my analysis concerns the deeper issue of the situationists’ argument structure. Fur-
thermore, in response to alternative explanations of speciﬁc test subjects’ behavior, situation-
ists can always assert that these apply at best to a limited set of cases. The situational factors
are so disparate and so often unconscious ormorally insigniﬁcant, situationists claim, that it is
not possible to provide a general explanation in terms of speciﬁc reasons. And indeed,
Merritt, Doris, and Harman reply to Sabini and Silber as follows:
These explanations [in terms of reasons] suppose that the actor acted on what he took (or on
reﬂection would take) to be a reason, but a large body of empirical work indicates that this
may relatively seldom be the case. (Merritt et al. 2010, 369–370)

























Thus, in response to alternative explanations of speciﬁc pieces of evidence, situationists can
assert that their own analysis applies “often” or “typically”, and that the alternative expla-
nation applies “rarely” or “relatively seldom”. By contrast, if, as I have argued, there is a
general and fundamental ﬂaw in their most basic inference, then this reply is no longer
available to them.
3. The argument for the core situationist thesis
To show, with more textual detail, that the analysis in the previous section really captures
the structure of the argument for the situationists’ core thesis, let me zoom in on their argu-
mentation concerning the Milgram experiments. The situationists explicitly regard these as
key evidence in support of their thesis and they discuss them on many occasions. The exper-
iments are well known, but, for the sake of completeness, I nevertheless introduce them
before discussing the situationists’ use of them.
The experiments Milgram describes in his book, Obedience to Authority (1974), were
designed to examine the conditions under which and the extent to which ordinary people
would obey an experimenter who requested that they administer increasingly severe electric
shocks to a likeable man whom they believed to be just another test subject. The latter was
designated the “learner”, and he was in fact collaborating in the experiment. The test sub-
jects were asked to shock him whenever he gave an incorrect answer on a word-pair
memory test, purportedly to see whether punishment enhanced learning. They were also
told that the shocks could be painful but were not dangerous. Contrary to most people’s
expectations, including Milgram’s own, almost all test subjects were willing to administer
extremely painful electric shocks. A two-thirds majority went so far as to administer shocks
of potentially lethal strength, where the levers were marked “danger: severe shock” (at 375
volt) or “XXX” (at 435 and 450 volt). The test subjects did so despite hearing the screams of
the confederate victim, and (at the higher shock levels) despite no longer hearing any
response; despite the victim’s explicit and repeated withdrawal of his consent (starting at
150 volt), and despite the fact (in some versions of the experiment) that the learner had
said beforehand that he worried about the shocks because he had a heart condition. And
they did so despite the fact that nothing seemed to hinge on their performance for them-
selves: they were paid in advance, there were no sanctions against quitting, and they
could simply have walked out the door. Many of them hesitated, worried, sweated, contem-
plated quitting, and consulted the experimenter, but when he requested that they continue,
most often they eventually did. Milgram ran 18 variations of the set-up (having two exper-
imenters who disagreed; having instructions given by telephone, moving the experiment off
campus, and so on), and determined that the crucial factor in compliance was the authority
attributed to the experimenter. Somehow, with a majority of test subjects, his authority out-
weighed anything the learner could do, say, or scream.
Situationists use the term “moral dissociation” for the divergence between the morally rel-
evant behavior of subjects and the moral values or norms that these subjects endorse (or
would endorse) upon reﬂection (Merritt et al. 2010, 363, note 16). To show that morally arbi-
trary situational factors (and the depersonalized response tendencies they trigger) are respon-
sible for the behavior, they proceed to consider two possibilities: either the Milgram subjects
endorse harming others for its own sake or they do not act on the basis of reasons and their
behavior is best explained by the inﬂuence of situational circumstances.
The situationists assume that, to make their case for the second option, they need to
show that most people do not aim to inﬂict harm on others for its own sake (Merritt


























hidden under the veneer of social conventions, most humans are wholehearted sadists. In
that case, their behavior would still be attributable to their (immoral) values or global char-
acter traits rather than to features of the situation, because it matches what one would expect
sadists to do. Situationists reject this explanation, however. Doris claims that the experiment
“does not suggest that Milgram had stumbled onto an aberrant pocket of sadists”; rather, it
highlights “the power of the situation” (Doris 2002, 42; see also the rhetorical question in
Harman 1999, 322). In their joint paper, Merritt, Doris, and Harman point to the “free
choice” permutation of the Milgram experiment for further support. Here, Milgram
allowed test subjects to set the shock level wherever they liked, and when given that
option, all test subjects chose to give only very light shocks (Merritt et al. 2010, 364–
365). In other words, situationists claim that it is not that the agents are sadistic (endorse
inﬂicting harm as such), but that “relevant features of the situation” cause the behavior
(Harman 1999, 322). According to Doris, “his [viz., Milgram’s] experiments are powerful
evidence for situationism”, because they show “how apparently noncoercive situational
factors may induce destructive behavior despite the apparent presence of contrary evalua-
tive and dispositional structures” (Doris 2002, 39). This is precisely the argumentative
structure discussed in the previous section. The assumption is that behavior should be
explained either in terms of the agents’ (moral or immoral) values, or, if their behavior
does not match one’s expectations (given these values), in terms of situational variables
(and the response tendencies they trigger).
Situationists’ interpretation of other empirical evidence follows the same pattern. In
much of Doris’ and Harman’s work, the argument has the form of an inference to the
best explanation: the alleged inconsistency of human behavior is said to be best explained
by reference to the hypothesis that behavior is governed by situational circumstance (Doris
2002, 26, 63; Harman 1999; see Merritt et al. 2010, 357, note 5, and Doris 2005, 633, note
4, where this argument structure is mentioned explicitly). But there are also versions of the
argument for the core thesis that aim to be deductively valid. For example, Peter Vranas
defends the following version:
[1] There are many situations in each of which most people (would) behave deplorably.
[2] There are many situations in each of which most people (would) behave admirably.
Thus: [C] Most people (would) behave deplorably in many (i.e., in an open list of actual or
counterfactual) situations and admirably in many other situations. (Vranas 2005, 4)
Vranas regards this conclusion as equivalent to the following formulation of his conclusion
in terms of “fragmentation”:
[C] Most (i.e., the majority of) people are fragmented. (Vranas 2005, 2)
“Fragmentation”, on Vranas’s account, entails “indeterminacy”, which means that a person
is neither good, nor bad, nor intermediate, but rather, “has no character status” (16; see also
Vranas 2009, 215).
In their joint essay, Merritt, Doris, and Harman formulate their argument as a modus
tollens, as follows (here with a focus on the robustness of traits):
(1) If behavior is typically ordered by robust traits, systematic observation will reveal pervasive
behavioral consistency.
(2) Systematic observation does not reveal pervasive behavioral consistency.
(3) Behavior is not typically ordered by robust traits. (Merritt et al. 2010, 357–358; identical in
Doris 2005, 633)

























They justify the second premise on the basis of ﬁndings in social psychology, including the
Milgram study (357).
In each of these versions of the argument, the crucial assumption is that stable, robust,
global trait-based consistency requires observable behavior that is either consistently good
(admirable, compassionate, etc.) or consistently bad (deplorable, sadistic, etc.). As I showed
in the previous section, however, this assumption is unwarranted because there are further
possibilities. Agents may endorse certain moral principles or values, yet stably give priority
to a different consideration, such as their private interest. Perhaps such agents’ behavior is
not fully rational all things considered; but it is not therefore “without intentional direction”,
governed by “depersonalized response tendencies” triggered by trait-irrelevant situational
factors.7 Furthermore, it is also possible for agents to be wholehearted in their pursuit of,
say, their own interests or their safety, and when that is the case, their behavior may
again be consistent without being consistently good or consistently bad in terms of the
moral values situationists use as a standard.
4. Another look at the evidence
If one allows for the possibility of non-malicious vices and the wholehearted pursuit of non-
mainstream moral values (for example, those endorsed by ethical egoism), the behavioral
evidence appears in a new light. This can again be illustrated by reference to Milgram’s
ﬁndings. The explanation of the “obedient” test subjects’ behavior in terms of situational
factors remains a possibility. But this explanation is now one possibility among many
others that should be considered: For example, one subject may be too cowardly to defy
the experimenter’s request, for fear of rebuke or embarrassment; another may outsource
the moral responsibility for his own decisions to the experimenter, out of moral indolence;
a third may craft excuses by blaming the learner for giving the wrong answers. Most people
consider these reasons to be bad reasons for continuing to shock the victim, morally speak-
ing, and this may explain the agony and intense inner conﬂict visibly experienced by many
of Milgram’s subjects. But one can no longer rule out that their behavior is the manifestation
of stable and robust global character traits – for example, cowardice, indolence, or a dis-
position to shift blame to others – for these are all traits that do not manifest themselves
in the form of observable behavior that is either consistently morally good or consistently
morally bad. The coward may do the morally right thing when no courage is required; the
indolent may do so when it is easy, and so on.
If one approaches the evidence with these possibilities in mind, the Milgram results are
compatible with experimental evidence that shows extremely high helping rates under non-
dangerous and unambiguous conditions, such as in the “electrocution” experiment by Clark
and Word (1974).8 Moreover, the latter study shows that helping rates drop when helping is
perceived to be dangerous or when the situation is ambiguous. This pattern is exactly what
one would expect in a population in which the value of beneﬁcence is widely endorsed but
in which many agents have one or more (non-malicious) vices. After all, danger and ambi-
guity would give the coward and the indolent grounds for not helping.
Whether and to what extent explanations in terms of non-malicious vices (or non-main-
stream virtues) are in fact warranted in speciﬁc cases can be established only on the basis of
sufﬁcient evidence. In any given case, working out the correct explanation may be compli-
cated. One cannot know on the basis of a single observation of helping-in-front-of-cameras
whether a politician’s behavior betrays egoism,9 and the same point holds in the case of the
Milgram subjects. Longitudinal studies involving the same subjects would be required, but


























indolence, or cowardice may provide the best explanation; in the case of others, appeal to
“depersonalized response tendencies” might be more appropriate. I do not mean to deny
that the latter exist, but I have argued that it does not follow from the behavioral evidence
presented by the situationists that morally relevant behavior is typically the result of situa-
tional factors activating such tendencies.
At this point, situationists may insist that the different rates of obedience in the different
permutations of the Milgram study do constitute evidence in favor of the situationist expla-
nation. Obedience rates varied greatly depending on whether the instructions were given by
telephone or in person, whether the instructions came from one experimenter or from two
who disagreed with each other, or whether the experiment was conducted at Yale University
or at a run-down ofﬁce building off campus, for example. If the morally relevant core
elements of the case are the same (namely, a subject being asked to deliver painful and poss-
ibly lethal shocks to an innocent learner), and if the differences between the scenarios are
actually irrelevant to the moral quandary that the subjects face, then – situationists might
insist – only the situational differences explain the different obedience rates.
Non-malicious vices and non-mainstream virtues may also provide an explanation for
the variability of obedience rates between scenarios, however. If fear of embarrassment is
motivating you (Sabini and Silver 2005), it is all too understandable – psychologically
speaking – that you would be more obedient in front of a live experimenter than in response
to a voice through the telephone, and more obedient in front of a Yale University exper-
imenter than one without a prestigious afﬁliation. If you tend to outsource moral responsi-
bility for difﬁcult decisions to others, it is much easier to do so when there is one
experimenter with authority than when there are two experimenters who disagree with
each other. And so on. Similarly, in terms of the earlier example: If you are an egoistic poli-
tician looking to be elected, you are more likely to be beneﬁcent in front of cameras than
when they are absent, other things being equal; and you are also more likely to show ben-
eﬁcence in front of the cameras of national news stations than those from an unimportant
foreign country; and with more rather than fewer cameras, and so on. These situational vari-
ables may be irrelevant to the moral question of whether you ought to help the person in
need. But the cameras are highly relevant to the question whether it serves your interest
to do so. In other words, situational variables may be morally irrelevant while being
highly relevant to a range of global character traits.
We need not assume – in fact, it strikes me as highly unlikely – that there is one reason
or trait, such as fear of embarrassment or pusillanimity, that covers the behavior of most or
all individuals in a speciﬁc experiment. Our explanations of human behavior probably have
to be more ﬁne-grained than that assumption allows, but this is an empirical issue that I do
not pursue here (see Bates, unpublished manuscript, for more discussion of the relevant evi-
dence in relation to a range of vices).
I have again mostly focused on the example of agents who endorse certain moral stan-
dards that they fail to meet. As was the case above, I did this to capture the cases that situa-
tionists discuss when they point out the divergence between agents’ values and their
behavior. The argument again extends, however, to the behavior of wholehearted egoists
and others whose values differ from those situationists take to be most widely shared.
The ethical egoist, for example, will disagree as to which behavior is “admirable” or
“deplorable” in the ﬁrst place (to use Vranas’s terms in the argument mentioned in the pre-
vious section).
At the end of this discussion of the argument for the core thesis of situationism, the
reader may wonder what to make, then, of the empirical psychological studies that
provide evidence of the inﬂuence of seemingly insigniﬁcant elements of the situation on

























human behavior: the smell of cookies, the weather, mood effects, priming effects, and more.
These studies provide very important information, and their moral signiﬁcance should not
be underestimated. But even if it seems impossible to explain agents’ behavior in terms of
reasons or global traits, in such cases, these studies do not amount to proof of the core thesis
of situationism; they support only a much weaker claim. They show that human behavior is
sometimes or perhaps even often – a deliberately vague term – inﬂuenced by factors
outside the agent’s conscious control. They do not show that it is “typically” inﬂuenced
by such factors, that global trait-based consistency is “rare enough to count as abnormal”,
or that reason plays virtually no role in our morally relevant behavior.
The situationist argument for these stronger claims – that is, for the core thesis of situa-
tionism – depends on the premise that evidence reveals the absence of the required kind of
behavioral consistency across the board. This premise in turn depends on the invalid infer-
ence from studies such as the Milgram experiments, studies which situationists regard as
key evidence in support of their thesis but which may actually permit an explanation of
the observed behavior in terms of reasons and global character traits.
5. Who takes remedial measures?
A second overlooked difﬁculty with the situationist position emerges when we examine
what is involved in situation management.10 This is the situationists’ alternative to the tra-
ditional emphasis, in moral education and self-improvement, on developing or improving
moral character. The problem is that the conception of agency implicit in this recommen-
dation is at odds with the situationists’ core thesis.
Situationists have regularly expressed optimism that their theory provides the key to
improving human behavior. Doris, for example, argues that we should try to “avoid . . . ethi-
cally dangerous circumstances” and “seek near occasions for happier behaviors – situations
conducive to ethically desirable conduct” (Doris 2002, 147), that we have a duty to attend to
the features in situations that inﬂuence our behavior and to engage in “skilled self-manipu-
lation”. He claims that this “enhances normative competence” and leads to “more respon-
sible agency” (Doris 2002, 146–149). As an example, Doris mentions a situation in which
you receive an invitation from a colleague with whom you have had a long ﬂirtation, to
have dinner while your spouse is out of town. You, however, sincerely value ﬁdelity.
Doris writes that:
if you take the lessons of situationism to heart, you avoid the dinner like the plague, because
you know that you are not able to conﬁdently predict your behavior in a problematic situation
on the basis of your antecedent values. (Doris 2002, 147)
In their joint essay, Merritt, Doris, and Harman discuss empirical research showing that
mechanisms of self-control and self-monitoring can be strengthened through training and
deliberate self-improvement. The individual cannot go it alone: supportive social contexts
are also necessary, as are institutional and legal structures (Merritt 2000; Merritt et al. 2010).
Mark Alfano has argued that we should not merely choose or avoid given situations, but
also produce or create situational contexts with an eye to their likely effect on our own be-
havior and that of others (Alfano 2013a, 2013b).
When we ﬂesh out what situation management involves, however, we see that its advo-
cates are implicitly committed to the ideal of a stable and robust global disposition to
manage one’s situations. Furthermore, taking the proposed remedial measures involves a


























principle that is to become effective in the agent’s behavior across a range of different situ-
ations. Both ideas are at odds with the situationist core thesis discussed in the previous
sections.
For the sake of argument, I assume that situation management is a good idea and that it
works; there is indeed a large amount of evidence of its effectiveness (e.g. Alfano 2013a,
2013b). My point is not directed against the idea of situation management as such, but
against the way in which situationists use this idea. I argue that they cannot account, in
terms of their own core thesis, for the type of agency involved in the activity of situation
management they recommend. This is the second problem for situationism.
Postponing for the moment the question of whether situation management requires a
constant effort or whether it is restricted to the cool hour of reﬂection, consider ﬁrst what
it means to engage in it, and consider further the features of the managing self that are
implied.11 These features include at least the following:12
(1) Moral consciousness and moral judgment: the situationists must assume there is a
ﬁrst-personal singular subject (I ) who uses a moral criterion and has a working con-
sciousness of moral obligation. After all, if I am to take the remedial measures and
manage my situations for the reason the situationists mention, I must believe it to be
morally important to improve my behavioral patterns.13
(2) Moral motivation on the basis of moral insight: furthermore, and even more impor-
tantly, situationists must presuppose that my insight into the moral beneﬁt and
empirical feasibility of situation management can or does motivate me to carry
out the remedial program. (Presumably, the theoretical conclusions of the situation-
ists’ arguments are to become motivationally efﬁcacious in their readership and
beyond.) Even if the point of situation management is to outsource much of the
motivational burden of morally relevant action to my social and institutional
environment, the process of getting my environment set up in this way requires a
deliberate effort. This, situationists are assuming, I can be motivated to do on the
basis of my insight into the normative necessity of doing so. In short, in the case
of the managing self, situationists presuppose that it is psychologically realistic
to allow for rationally motivated moral action.
(3) A stable, robust, and global disposition to manage one’s situations: the rec-
ommended attitude of the situation manager has all the features of a stable,
robust, and global disposition. It is conceived as an active and long-lasting commit-
ment to engage in certain forms of situation-managing behavior under the relevant
circumstances, a stable commitment that is grounded in inner moral convictions
and that manifests itself in outward behavioral patterns. The managing self
stably attends to the features in situations that inﬂuence one’s own behavior,
aims to avoid morally dangerous circumstances, and seeks to establish behavioral
contexts that are conducive to the desired behavior; and this shows itself in outward
behavioral patterns. Moreover, this disposition ranges over a wide variety of situ-
ations. Even if situation management concerns an agent’s behavior in speciﬁc
“local” contexts (as situationists are likely to argue), this does not make the mana-
ging as such a merely local affair. When the managing subject selects which local
circumstances to target, the agent does so from a broader moral perspective. More-
over, the disposition to manage one’s situations has to span at least several different
situational contexts. It has to span at least the situational contexts of informing
oneself about psychological mechanisms, of selecting local situations to target,
implementing empirically informed strategies for behavioral improvement,

























monitoring one’s subsequent behavior, and providing feedback regarding the need
for further efforts – and this is only its bare minimum range. Finally, this disposi-
tion is unavoidably conceived as “robust” (or “motivationally self-sufﬁcient”,
Merritt 2000, 374). The managing self as such cannot rely on the support of
moral scaffolding, because its task is to establish a morally supportive situational
context in the ﬁrst place.
In other words, the assumptions implicit in the situationists’ recommendation of situ-
ation management add up to the ideal of a certain type of moral agent, held up as a feasible
ideal. This is the ideal of a global, robust, and stable disposition to manage one’s situations
in the morally appropriate way; a disposition, moreover, that is grounded in moral commit-
ments and manifests itself in observable behavior (that is, in the actual management of one’s
situations).
I am not suggesting that this set of assumptions places situationists in the Aristotelian
camp or that it commits them to one or more Aristotelian virtues; rather, my point is that it
betrays a tension within situationism itself. The recommended situation management
involves the ideal of a stable, robust, global, and reason-based disposition (namely, the dis-
position to manage one’s situations), although the core situationist thesis is that such global
dispositions rarely exist and do not qualify as a feasible ideal for the general population.
Importantly, the inconsistency does not lie in the fact that agents are expected to
improve their behavior as a result of situation management. Rather, the inconsistency
lies in the fact that the very remedial measures themselves require, on the part of the mana-
ging agent, processes that are governed by the actor’s evaluative commitments (to use the
very terms the situationists use to describe the position they reject, quoted above). The
managing self cannot yet rely on the results that situation management is supposed to
produce.
Moreover, within the situationist framework, the proposal of remedial measures faces a
serious bootstrapping problem. In order to remedy the alleged problem that our behavior
typically occurs “without intentional direction”, ourmanaging self is supposed to intention-
ally direct our behavior (namely, to manage our situations by intentionally selecting speciﬁc
strategies). In order to remedy the alleged problem that our behavior does not conform to
our moral norms, ourmanaging self is supposed to make our behavior conform to our moral
norms (namely, by managing the right kind of situations in the right way).
Faced with the critique that their proposed remedy contradicts their own diagnosis,
situationists could respond in two ways. They could reply that their recommendation of
remedial measures is restricted to a speciﬁc group of people, or that it is restricted to a
speciﬁc form or domain of behavior. They are unlikely to choose the ﬁrst route. They
cannot restrict the ideal of the situation manager to a moral elite with the ability to organize
the social world such that it becomes morally safer for the rest of us (for example, by pater-
nalistically establishing a social and institutional environment set up to produce morally
desirable behavior in others). The situationists’ own standard of broad psychological
realism, in light of which they criticize Aristotelianism, does not allow them to posit a
moral ideal that only few people can realize.
Situationists will more likely reply that situation management differs from other forms
of action. In describing the practice of situation management, they write that the “proactive
formulation of personal goals and policies, explicitly targeting situational factors pre-ident-
iﬁed as problematic, may on the occasion of action diminish the inﬂuence of unwelcome
automatic tendencies” (Merritt et al. 2010, 388; cf. Alfano 2013b, 254). The locution


























“action” – as if situation management is not a form of action – but we may interpret the
passage to mean that management is a form of second-order action. If so, however, it is
no less “action” for that. “Attending to situations”, “targeting problematic situational
factors”, or “formulating personal goals and policies” are all forms of action by any reason-
able deﬁnition of the term. If action is typically governed by situational circumstance, then
so is situation management.
But situationists might insist that things are not as bad as I make them sound because
situation management is limited to proactive activity during the cool hour of reﬂection (the
“cooler decision contexts” mentioned in Doris 2002, 148). This would not make the
problem go away, but situationists might claim that it would at least conﬁne it.
They do not provide much argument or evidence to show that it is or can be so con-
ﬁned, however. For one thing, it is hard to see how they could even exempt the agent in
the “cool hour” from being “governed by the situation”, given their core thesis. For
another, “ethically dangerous circumstances” may occur at any time in our daily lives
and in ways that are impossible to foresee, as situationists themselves never tire of point-
ing out. This makes it hard to see how we can anticipate in the cool hour exactly which
situations to seek or avoid. Who would prepare speciﬁcally to refuse enticing-dinner-
invitations-from-attractive-colleagues-while-one’s-spouse-is-out-of-town? Assuming the
thought of doing so occurs to one, and given that situationists highlight psychological
evidence regarding the inﬂuence of such factors as the smell of cookies or the amount
of sunshine, who really knows whether in one’s own case one should train differently
for invitations coming in when it is sunny as compared to when it is cloudy, when
one’s kitchen smells of cookies or when it reeks of garbage, or when one has just
found or lost a dime? And who knows how these and inﬁnitely many other, largely
unconscious and morally insigniﬁcant situational features interact with one another to
inﬂuence one’s response to a speciﬁc invitation? Yet, when one receives a “dangerous”
phone call from the attractive colleague in Doris’ example, one needs to assess the risks
correctly and muster the necessary strength to decline the invitation right then and there.
Is this decision context indeed “cool”, as Doris implies by mentioning it as an example,
or is it actually pretty “hot” already? My point here is not to deny that proactive situation
management has positive effects (it certainly does), nor to assert that situation manage-
ment is more complicated than situationists allow (situationists know it is complex and
say so, Doris 2002, 148). My point, rather, is that relegating situation management to a
“cool hour” separate from the “occasion of action” seems impossible and that some form
of situation management also has to take place “on the occasion of action”. It would
seem that the managing self should be on duty at all times – even if only in the back-
ground – attending to the relevant features of situations as they develop. Therefore, the
conﬁnement strategy faces serious difﬁculties.
There is another, more fundamental problem with the “cool hour” reply, however. If the
agent improves her behavior as a result of careful situation management, then her later
behavior is no longer just due to “the power of the situation” and “without intentional direc-
tion”. For then her behavior is most fundamentally the result of her intentionally selecting
one situation (dinner alone) rather than another (romantic dinner with her ﬂirtatious col-
league). Therefore, even if we could restrict situation management to cooler contexts, a
situationist should credit the desired behavior that results from these efforts (ﬁdelity), at
least in part, to the reason-motivated activities of the situation-managing agent, and not
just to “the power of the situation” in which the agent acts.
Situationists, therefore, face a dilemma. They should either frankly acknowledge that
situation management involves motivation on the basis of moral insight and a global

























disposition to manage one’s action contexts in the morally appropriate way, or they should
give up their optimism regarding remedial measures. Abandoning this optimism is not
really an option, because they cite empirical studies showing that situation management
has positive effects. Distancing themselves from the psychological evidence would there-
fore involve distancing themselves from the psychological realism they advocate. But if
they frankly acknowledge the crucial importance of the reason-motivated effort to cause
one’s behavior to become morally better (namely, of the agent’s intentionally managing
her situational contexts in order to cause her subsequent behavior to improve),14 they are
forced to attribute a central role to practical reason in their own empirically informed phi-
losophical account of moral agency.
6. Conclusion
Situationists argue that morally relevant behavior is typically best explained in terms of
situational factors beyond the agent’s awareness and control, that “depersonalized response
tendencies” account for most of human moral behavior, and that conceptions of practical
rationality play at most a marginal role in empirically sophisticated accounts of moral cog-
nition and behavior. I have argued that their argument for this thesis fails, and that the thesis
lacks the empirical plausibility situationists claim for it. Furthermore, even situationists
themselves implicitly attribute a central role to reason-motivated action when they rec-
ommend situation management.
These conclusions do not diminish the importance of empirical psychology for moral
theory and practice. There is clear evidence that some of our morally relevant behavior
is inﬂuenced by morally irrelevant situational factors. But situationists argue for a much
stronger thesis: They claim that human moral behavior is typically best explained in
terms of such factors. The rejection of situationism is fully compatible with the endorsement
of the more moderate (and much less newsworthy) thesis that human moral behavior is
sometimes or even often inﬂuenced by situational factors such as the weather or the
smell of cookies, and that morality requires us to counteract their inﬂuence in some
cases and to use it in others.
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Notes
1. Situationists do not usually claim that situations determine behavior in a direct sense. Rather,


























tendencies in individuals, thus leading to behavior mediately. Different individuals have differ-
ent response tendencies, and as a result, there may be behavioral differences among individuals
acting in similar situations (Doris 2002, 25–26; Merritt et al. 2010, 370).
2. Situationists also criticize the assumption that virtues are ‘evaluatively integrated’, arguing that
agents instead tend to have dispositions that are inconsistent with each other and with the norms
agents endorse. I do not focus on evaluative integration because my argument concerns the prior
and more fundamental issue of the existence of global character traits as such.
3. Because situationism is at odds with common assumptions regarding human behavior, some
authors describe the core of situationism as the thesis that ‘the behavior of a given person in
a given situation depends more on characteristics of the situation and less on characteristics
of the person than people typically assume’ (Vranas 2005, 3, emphasis added). If the core
thesis is described in terms of a contrast with what people typically assume, however, this
makes the content of the position unstable or its truth dependent on how many people
believe it.
4. For helpful reviews of the background and history of the debate, see Alfano (2013a); Sarkissian
(2010); Upton (2009a).
5. Some opponents of situationism have pointed out that the evidence presented by situationists
does not show that broad character traits do not exist; virtue may be rare, or the evidence
may be of the wrong kind (cf. Miller 2003, 2009, 2010; Snow 2010; Wielenberg 2006).
Others have criticized the situationists’ conception of character (Annas 2005; Badhwar 2009;
Kamtekar 2004; Kristja´nsson 2008; Kupperman 2001; Sreenivasan 2002; Upton 2009b;
Webber 2006, 2007). Critics of situationism have also suggested speciﬁc traits that could
explain the empirical evidence (Badhwar 2009; Sabini and Silver 2005). Finally, some have cri-
ticized the distinction between ‘person’ and ‘situation’ (Sarkissian 2010, 5–12). Critics of situa-
tionism often regard these rebuttals as sufﬁcient to put the matter to rest, but situationists
disagree. From their point of view, there are rejoinders to these criticisms. For example, in
response to the assertion that virtue may indeed simply be rare, situtionists have asserted that
their claim is ‘not that people fail standards for good conduct, but that people can be induced
to do so with such ease’ (Merritt et al. 2010, 357). Furthermore, when opponents of situationism
argue that what matters for character are one’s inner values and traits, even if these do not trans-
late into observable behavior, situationists tend to regard this as an admission of the behavioral
irrelevance of character. Doris (2002) anticipates many objections; most recently and exten-
sively, Alfano (2013a, ch. 3; 2013b, 243–252). Both sides claim that they can successfully
defend their position against their opponents. On the debate, see also Prinz (2009, 120–127).
6. Non-malicious vices should not be confused with what Christian Miller calls ‘mixed traits’
(Miller 2013, 2014). Miller considers the traits themselves as ‘evaluatively mixed’. By contrast,
I consider non-malicious vices, qua forms of moral failure, to have only negative valence. The
observable behavior that stems from such vices may sometimes happen to harmonize with
moral demands, but that does not mean that the trait that underlies the behavior is itself partially
morally good. In such cases, the moral desirability of the resulting behavior is entirely acciden-
tal to the underlying trait, as the example of the egoistic politician illustrates.
7. In line with the argument for their core thesis, situationists have a tendency to equate vice with
malice, and to conceive of vice in terms of the endorsement of different values. Doris only
brieﬂy considers non-malicious vices, merely to ask whether cowardly behavior could in prin-
ciple be the expression of an agent’s values. His answer, tellingly, is simply afﬁrmative:
‘perhaps the coward values safety more than honor, loyalty, and dignity’ (Doris 2002, 20).
On Doris’ construal, the coward does not fail to live up to a standard of courage (not his
own, at least); he is someone who greatly values safety. This reduces talk of vice to normative
disagreement: what one person regards as a vice (cowardice) is what another person regards as a
virtue (putting safety ﬁrst). I regard this conception of vice as implausible but do not discuss it
further, because the argument in this essay does not depend on it. Incidentally, Christian Miller
similarly mentions as a criterion for possessing a vice that one not feel distress when acting in
accordance with the vice, and that one not believe doing so is wrong (Miller 2013, 303, 312–
313). On this understanding of vice, again, one cannot attribute vices to oneself (at least not
without being inconsistent or confused).
8. Another study sometimes mentioned in this context shows that many subjects were willing to
pursue a thief of a purse they had agreed to watch on behalf of some else (Moriarty 1975). This
is a more complex case, however, because of the element of previous agreement.

























9. For a detailed and more general exposition of this point, from an Aristotelian perspective, see
Kristja´nsson (2008).
10. I focus on situation management, although situationists sometimes also recommend self-man-
agement or self-manipulation. My analysis in this section applies equally to these other rec-
ommendations, as well as to Alfano’s recommendation that we use ‘moral technology’ to
cause ourselves and others to behave ‘in accordance with’ moral virtues, even if not ‘from’
virtues (Alfano 2013a).
11. ‘Self’ here refers to whatever the situationists regard as the subject of situation management.
12. I here mention only the presuppositions that are relevant to the argument that follows. The full
list is longer and includes other assumptions that sit uneasily with the situationist position. For
example, it also includes the assumption of effective self-monitoring (I must not engage in too
much rationalization or confabulation), even though situationists claim that our cognitive pro-
cesses are also ‘highly susceptible to situational variation’ (Merritt et al. 2010, 359).
13. Furthermore, the selection of situation management strategies should satisfy moral constraints.
If I believe that my avoiding temptation requires your being locked up, it is not therefore
morally permissible for me to lock you up. Which moral criterion is the right one is a separate
question, however. Situationists explicitly abstract from that question, however, and this is legit-
imate within the scope of their argument.
14. This seems to be the position taken in Merritt et al. (2010, 388).
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